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Abstract 
 
In this paper we estimate the degree of market power at the bank-level for 84 banking 
systems worldwide. Subsequently, we analyze the sources of bank competition, placing emphasis 
on the impact of financial reform and the quality of institutions. We find that financial 
liberalization policies reduce the market power of banks in developed countries with advanced 
politico-institutional milieus. In contrast, banking competition does not improve at the same pace 
in countries with weaker institutions and a lower level of economic development. The results 
hold across a wide array of identification tests and estimation methods. The main policy 
implication to be drawn is that a certain level of institutional maturity is a precondition for the 
success of reforms aimed at enhancing competition and efficiency of banking markets.  
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1. Introduction 
The political economy literature has uncovered a significant relationship between the 
financial and banking system and state institutions (e.g. Andrianova et al., 2008). Similarly, the 
banking literature has placed strong emphasis in examining the level of banking sector 
competition in a number of countries (see Carbo et al., 2009, and references therein). However, 
less consideration has been given to the financial liberalization policies and the political and 
institutional forces that shape competition in the banking sector. This seems to be of primary 
importance, since financial liberalization aims to improve efficiency and competitive conditions 
in the banking sector and, subsequently, economic outcomes (Demetriades and Andrianova, 
2004). Yet, experience shows that the short- or medium-term outcomes of these policies are 
related to concentrated banking markets (Delis, 2010) or increased financial instability 
(Demirguc-Kunt and Detragiache, 1998). This paper is the first attempt to elaborate on these 
issues by emphasizing the role of institutions in the financial liberalization-bank competition 
nexus. To this end, we investigate empirically the separate and combined effect that the 
institutional environment and financial liberalization policies have on bank competition (lower 
market power of banks) across a large set of countries.  
But why are institutions potentially important determinants of bank competition and an 
important element in explaining the pattern of the financial liberalization-bank competition 
nexus? The wave of financial liberalization policies of the 1980s and 1990s led unambiguously 
to increased competition in the banking sector, primarily through the removal of entry barriers, 
liberalization of product restrictions and elimination of intra-sectoral controls (Claessens, 2010). 
These reforms were stimulated, first and foremost, by the political-economy debate on the 
potential positive impact of financial liberalization policies on economic outcomes. King and 
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Levine (1993), Cetorelli and Strahan (2006) and Jayaratne and Strahan (1998), among many 
others, suggest that financial liberalization increases the long-run growth rate of the economy by 
fostering financial development. In addition, liberalization policies usually involve extensive 
privatization of formerly state-owned banks, which is in turn positively related to improved 
efficiency and stronger incentives to invest in new and better technology. Last but not least, 
Galindo et al. (2007) show that financial liberalization improves the allocation of investments 
especially in developing countries, and Delis et al. (2010) that stricter banking regulations, 
especially those associated with market discipline and activity restrictions, widen the distribution 
of income. 
This positive view of financial liberalization is somewhat clouded by the marked increase 
in financial fragility experienced in both developed and developing countries in the 1980s and 
1990s. Demirguc-Kunt and Detragiache (1998) show that the probability of financial fragility 
following financial liberalization policies is positively associated with weaker institutions, 
especially those related to the rule of law, the level of corruption and contract enforcement. On 
the same line, the work of Jean-Jacques Laffont (as summarized by Estache and Wren-Lewis, 
2009) shows that institutional weaknesses in developing countries make the optimal reform 
policy different from that of developed countries. Tirole (1991) suggests that liberalization and 
privatization without preparatory de-monopolization would create a segmented market 
dominated by private firms with considerable market power. This is because under central 
planning, production takes place by only a few entities, while foreign penetration is unlikely to 
occur in the short-term. Joskow et al. (1994) point out that, in the case of Russia, product-level 
concentration of production created monopoly problems and, although restructuring prior to 
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privatization would have been desirable, political and institutional underdevelopment constraints 
largely precluded it.  
A parallel line of literature argues that private ownership and management have not 
improved performance, especially in sectors where there is no competition (for a review, see 
Boubakri et al., 2008). Also, varying transition paths from central planning to a market economy 
have resulted in different legal and politico-institutional frameworks, which have consequently 
affected the efficient functioning of banking systems. For example, in some cases, privatization 
was implemented so as to benefit the political power holders of the previous regime. This led to 
what some have described as “political capitalism”, which encourages oligopolistic market 
structures (Staniszkis, 1991). In other banking systems, a stark dichotomy of ownership between 
state and foreign private capital has been observed, in what has been branded “capitalism without 
capitalists” (Eyal et al., 1998). Finally, the relatively weak legal systems of developing and 
transition countries, as well as the high levels of networking and corruption in the respective 
financial systems, may have limited the strength of competitive forces at least as long as 
financial integration has not advanced. First-hand evidence on this is provided in the recent work 
of Beck and Hesse (2009) for the stagnant lending rates in the banking system of Uganda and of 
Brock and Suarez (2000) for Latin American countries. 
Based on the above opposing arguments, we expect that financial reform policies aiming 
at enhanced liberalization will drive market power of banks down. However, this effect may be 
less potent or delayed for countries with relatively weak institutions. Is this the case? On this 
basis the present empirical analysis answers three main questions: 
(i) Are the competitive conditions in the banking sectors of countries or groups of countries 
different? 
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(ii) Did financial liberalization policies succeed in generating competitive conditions in the 
banking systems worldwide?  
(iii)What was the role of the institutional environment in shaping banking sector competition 
during and after the financial reforms?    
To answer these questions, we first estimate the market power of individual banks in 84 
countries over a relatively long time frame that encompasses periods of financial reform. We use 
a new method to estimate market power, namely the indicator proposed by Boone et al. (2005) 
and Boone (2008), which has clear theoretical underpinnings and is robust to a number of 
specification issues relative to our sample. In doing this, we essentially provide a new index of 
market power for a large number of banking systems worldwide. As a robustness check, we also 
use the Lerner index and a concentration ratio. Subsequently, we examine whether financial 
liberalization policies improve bank competition, and whether this effect is uniform across 
countries with different levels of institutional strength. 
The results show, on the one hand, that competitive conditions are quite different 
between countries (and groups of countries) and, on the other, that financial reforms are 
important in containing the market power of banks. Yet, this importance diminishes in countries 
with weak institutions and a comparatively low level of economic development. Therefore, we 
suggest that relatively underdeveloped banking systems, in less advanced politico-institutional 
milieus, overall fail to benefit from reforms in their early stages. Among the institutional 
characteristics, improved transparency (low corruption) and bureaucratic quality are the single 
most important prerequisites for financial reforms to have a significant impact on bank 
competition. In addition, in developed countries these effects are more pronounced for large 
banks, which are usually the ones that possess higher market power. Thus, a concentrated 
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banking system does not entail a non-competitive banking system if institutions are robust. In a 
nutshell, the policy implication to be drawn is that a certain level of institutional maturity is a 
precondition for the success of reforms aimed at enhancing competition in the banking sector. 
Our study is naturally related to a large literature on banking sector competition. Studies 
closer to our goals are those of Claessens and Laeven (2004) and Hasan and Marton (2003). 
Their findings suggest that the abolishment of activity restrictions, flexible approaches to 
privatization and liberal policies towards foreign banks’ involvement with the domestic 
institutions helps building a relatively stable, more competitive and increasingly efficient 
banking system. Other studies (e.g. Bikker and Haaf, 2002; Carbo et al., 2009; Delis, 2010) 
estimate the level of competition in several banking industries, but do not examine the 
institutional and political forces that shape banking-sector competition. However, these studies 
do show that banking sectors in former centrally-planned economies are characterized by higher 
market power compared to developed banking systems, thus providing another strong incentive 
to trace the differences in these findings in the theoretical arguments of the political economy 
and development literature highlighted above.  
The rest of this paper is structured along the following lines. Section 2 discusses the 
methodology used to estimate market power at the bank-level and reports average results by 
country and over time. Section 3 presents the explanatory variables used to study the relationship 
between bank competition, financial liberalization and institutions. Section 4 presents the 
empirical findings and Section 5 concludes the paper.  
 
 
 
 7
2. Empirical model and estimation of bank market power 
The general empirical model used to study the relationship between banking sector 
competition, financial liberalization and institutions is of the following form:  
0 1 2 3 4itc tc tc tc itc itcMP b b FR b IE b M b B ε= + + + + + .     (1) 
In Eq. (1) the market power MP of bank i at time t that operates in country c is written as a 
function of the time- and country-dependent financial reforms variable FR; a vector of variables 
IE that characterize the institutional environment of each country; a vector of control variables M 
that reflect the macroeconomic conditions in the banking systems examined; and a vector of 
bank-level control variables B. Finally, ε is the stochastic disturbance. Below we analyze the 
methodologies used to estimate the market power of individual banks (i.e. the dependent variable 
in Eq. 1). 
Estimation of the competitive conditions in the banking industry has attracted the interest 
of many researchers over the last three decades (for a recent review see Carbo et al., 2009). Here, 
we primarily resort to the method proposed by Boone (2008) and applied to the banking sector 
by Leuvensteijn et al. (2008) and Schaeck and Cihak (2010). This method possesses some 
significant advantages over other estimators of bank competition, at least for our purposes. We 
comment on these advantages below, after providing some theoretical background for the Boone 
indicator.  
 
2.1. The Boone indicator 
 In this section we briefly discuss the methodology presented in Leuvensteijn et al. (2008) 
and Schaeck and Cihak (2010), who use the method of Boone et al. (2005) and Boone (2008) to 
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estimate market power in the banking sector. We assume that each bank i in an industry 
(country) c produces one symmetrically differentiated product q at time t and faces a demand  
( , )i i i jj ip q q a bq d q− ≠= − − ∑ ,         (2) 
where p is the price of the product q, a corresponds to the size of the market, b to the market 
elasticity of demand and d captures the extent to which consumers view the different products in 
a market as close substitutes. For simplicity, we drop the subscripts t and c from the respective 
equations. This is a Cournot-Nash game, with the first-order condition being  
2 0i j ij ia bq d q mc≠− − − =∑ .        (3)  
If N banks are present in the banking system, one obtains N first-order conditions of the form 
( ) [(2 / 1) (2 / 1) ] /[(2 ( 1))(2 / 1)]i i i jjq mc b d a b d N mc mc b d N b d= − − + − + + − −∑ .  (4) 
Note, that Eq. (4) provides a relationship between output and marginal cost mc of 
individual banks. From the profits equation ( )i i i ip mc qπ = − , it then follows that profits depend 
on marginal costs in a quadratic way. Within this framework, and if profits are defined as 
variable profits that exclude entry costs, a bank enters the market if profits are higher than entry 
costs. 
In a powerful result, Boone (2008) shows that competition increases either when the 
products offered by different banks become closer substitutes and banks interact more 
aggressively (i.e. d increases, assuming d < b), or when entry costs decline. Under both 
conditions, the performance (here profits) of more efficient banks improves. Therefore, the 
empirical Boone indicator is simply  
ln lni ia mcπ β= +           (5) 
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In other words, the profits (performance) of banks with lower marginal costs (higher efficiency) 
are expected to increase, i.e. β should be negative. A lower market power (higher competition), 
implies that the value of β will be larger in absolute terms (more negative). Therefore, β serves as 
a continuous index of market power, and is referred as the Boone indicator. For more details on 
these issues, see Boone et al. (2005) and Boone (2008). 
 There are three advantages of this approach over the price-cost margin (Lerner index), 
which until recently was the method more often employed to study market power in banking. 
First, the price-cost margin is criticized for not being able to capture the degree of product 
substitutability (Vives 2008). Second, theoretical foundations of the price-cost margin as a 
measure of competition are not robust. In fact, a number of studies present models where higher 
competition leads to higher price-cost margins (for a review, see Boone, 2008).  
Finally, and presumably more important for our purposes, the Lerner index may be 
thought of as measuring not only bank competition, but also the strength of the profit-
maximizing incentives of banks. Especially in developing and transition countries (many of 
which are included in our sample) many banks may often have incentives that diverge widely 
from pure profit maximization and, subsequently, they are rather inefficient. In this case, low 
efficiency (high marginal cost) leads to low price-cost margins, which will misleadingly suggest 
a competitive situation. Moreover, in the process of liberalization, an increase in the profit-
maximizing behavior of banks will reflect a higher Lerner index, which is not necessarily 
associated with higher market power. In contrast, under the theoretical underpinnings of the 
Boone indicator, both the changing of a bank’s objectives (i.e. more focus on profits, efficiency 
and substitutability of products instead of pricing) and the changing of the competitors’ focus are 
an integral part of the model and its solution. Compared to the Lerner index, the key here is that 
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competitors’ behavior also changes, i.e. they become more (less) aggressive as competition 
increases (decreases), and that profits are accounted for. Therefore, an increase (decrease) in the 
absolute value of β is clearly and purely associated with higher (lower) competition.  
Besides the Boone indicator and the Lerner index, market power in the banking industry 
is often measured by the H-statistic developed by Panzar and Rosse (1987) or various 
concentration measures. The main drawback of the H-statistic, at least for the purpose of this 
study, is that it does not map as robustly into a range of non-competitive conditions. Therefore, it 
has limited use as a continuous measure of competition (see e.g., Shaffer, 2004). In turn, 
concentration ratios (or the Herfindahl-Hirschman index) have been shown to provide a poor 
approximation of the competitive conditions in the banking industry (see e.g. Claessens and 
Laeven, 2004; Schaeck and Cihak, 2010). In any case, we do employ below the Lerner index and 
a 3-bank concentration ratio to gain some further insights into our empirical results. 
 
2.2. Estimating the Boone indicator at the bank-level 
Estimation of Eq. (5) requires data on marginal cost, which is generally not available. 
Leuvensteijn et al. (2008) estimate marginal cost at the industry level and Schaeck and Cihak 
(2010) use data on average cost. Both studies obtain an estimate of the competitive conditions 
prevailing at the country level. Here, we differentiate from these studies in two ways. First, we 
opt for estimating market power at the bank level, because there may be wide differences across 
the market power of banks within the same country. This 3-way panel-dataset setup (banks, 
countries, time) greatly increases the explanatory power of our empirical investigation (our 
dependent variable will be available at the bank level) and helps minimizing concerns about 
potential identification problems.  
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Second, we relax the assumption of a constant marginal cost, mc, across all banks in the 
industry and we estimate it for each bank in the sample, thus deviating from the majority of 
previous literature on the estimation of both the Boone indicator and the Lerner index. In fact, 
Delis and Tsionas (2009) and Koetter and Poghosyan (2009) show that relaxing this assumption 
when estimating the Lerner index is highly important to ensure a minimum level of robustness of 
market power estimates. Also, the theoretical derivations of Boone (2008) summarized above, 
suggest that banks have different marginal costs mci. Thus, our modeling choice is in fact closer 
to the theoretical priors. We view both these extensions as particularly important for our study.  
We estimate marginal cost using the following linear cost function  
0 1 2 3ln ln ln lnit it it it itc a a q a d a w e= + + + +                       (6) 
where c is the total cost of bank i at time t, q is bank output, d is the value of bank deposits, w are 
the prices of inputs and e is a stochastic disturbance. From Eq. (6), the marginal cost of bank 
output is simply /it itc q∂ ∂ . Hence, in order to obtain observation-specific estimates of the 
marginal cost, we need to obtain observation-specific estimates of /it itc q∂ ∂ . This is accomplished 
by drawing on a non-parametric estimation technique to estimate Eq. (6), in particular the local 
regression (LR) technique as put forth by Cleveland and Devlin (1988). Bank-level estimates for 
all of the as (and thus of a1) are obtained through localization of the parameters. This 
methodology has been implemented by Delis and Tsionas (2009). More details both on the LR 
methodology and the estimation procedure are provided in Appendix A.  
Estimation of Eq. (6) using the aforementioned technique presents some considerable 
advantages, besides the obvious one of deriving observation-specific estimates of the marginal 
cost (which is not possible using parametric methods). First, the non-parametric nature of the 
method implies that no assumption regarding the functional form of the underlying production 
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relationship (and thus the cost function) is made globally, and it is well-known that it is quite 
difficult for the researcher to be certain that the “correct” functional form has been chosen. 
Therefore, choosing for example between the Cobb-Douglas, the translog or any other cost 
function is not an issue.1 Second, and given this qualification, economic hypotheses are not 
rejected simply because an “improper” functional form has been chosen. Third, localization 
implies that, besides obtaining bank-level marginal costs, bank-level elasticities of cost with 
respect to deposits and input prices are also obtained, which may be quite useful information for 
managers and policy-makers. In particular, banks may have market power in deposits, which can 
also be calculated on the basis of another indicator on deposit rates and a2. Last, but not least, the 
fact that LR (or any other local method) allows for observation-specific parameter estimates 
suggests a plausible approach to identify parameter heterogeneity, which may be of great 
importance in indicating individual bank strategies. For more on these issues, see Kumbhakar et 
al. (2007).  
Data for the bank variables are taken from BankScope. In terms of the time span of the 
database we go as far back as possible for each country, taking into account concerns associated 
with coverage and accounting issues. Therefore, we have bank data to cover all countries for 
which information on the country-specific variables (discussed in the following section) is 
available, yet the starting point is different for each country.2 All data are reported in euros and 
are expressed in constant prices where appropriate. We limit the empirical analysis to the 
unconsolidated statements of commercial banks, in order to reduce the possibility of introducing 
                                                 
1 In fact, we have experimented with the translog cost function and we obtained very similar results (within a 5 per 
cent range). 
2 We have contacted Bankscope on this front to verify that the definitions for the variables used are comparable 
across countries. Also, the suggestion was not to include data before 1987 for any country owing to differences in 
accounting standards. The same approach is undertaken by the study of Beck and Demirguc-Kunt (2009), who 
construct databases on similar variables on behalf of the World Bank.  
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aggregation bias in the results. Only banks with at least three sequential observations are 
included in the sample. Also, the data were reviewed for outliers or other inconsistencies (zero or 
negative values for e.g. assets or deposits) and some observations are excluded accordingly. We 
end up with a large unbalanced panel dataset that consists of 84,768 observations. This dataset 
covers approximately 81% of the total banking assets in the countries examined. Detailed 
information on the dataset (on a country-specific basis) is provided in Appendix B.  
Since it is not possible to consider the hundreds of products that banks offer 
simultaneously, modeling banking production requires aggregating outputs and inputs. To define 
inputs and outputs of banks we use the intermediation approach, where three inputs, namely 
labor, physical capital and deposits are used to produce earning assets (for details, see Berger and 
Humphrey, 1997 and for a similar implementation, see e.g. Brissimis et al., 2008; Berger et al., 
2009). In particular, bank costs (c) are measured by real total expenses of bank i at time t. Bank 
output (q) is proxied by the real total earning assets, which include loans, securities and other 
earning assets (such as derivatives, investments and insurance assets). d stands for real total 
deposits and short-term funding. Two input prices are considered, the first (w1) representing the 
price of labor (measured by the ratio of personnel expenses to total assets)3 and the second (w2) 
the price of physical capital (proxied by the ratio of total depreciation and other capital expenses 
to total fixed assets). All these variables were carefully reviewed for inconsistencies owing to 
changes in accounting schemes over the sample period (descriptive statistics are reported in 
Appendix B). In addition, we examine the sensitivity of our results by controlling for credit risk 
(using the ratio of non-performing loans to total loans). Changes in the results are not significant; 
                                                 
3 We divide personnel expenses by total assets because the Bankscope database lacks data for the number of bank 
employees for many banks. A similar approach has been followed by many other relevant papers (see e.g. Altunbas 
et al., 2001; Claessens and Laeven, 2004). 
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however, this measure was not available for many of the banks in the early years of our sample 
and, therefore, we report the results of the model without credit risk. 
 
2.3. Estimates of bank market power 
Estimation of Eq. (6) and, subsequently of Eq. (5) is carried out for the full sample, since 
(i) the Boone indicator does not need defining the market boundaries (Boone, 2008) and (ii) 
bank-level (and thus also country-level) heterogeneity is accounted for by the local technique.4 
We report average estimates for the Boone indicator on a country- and time-specific basis in 
Table 1. These values are effectively a new index of banking-sector competition, which to our 
knowledge has the largest country and time coverage compared to other studies of bank 
competition in the world (see e.g. Bikker and Spierdijk, 2008). For expositional brevity, values 
on the Boone indicator are multiplied by 10. Note that the values reported are directly 
comparable between countries, given the properties of the indicator and the estimation 
methodology.  
The overall picture emerging from the average scores of market power for the countries 
examined is mixed. In Figure 1 we show the trend in banking sector competition over time, by 
plotting average market power estimates across (i) all countries, (ii) high-income countries, (iii) 
transition countries and (iv) lower-middle and low-income countries. The categorization of 
countries is made by the World Bank. Overall, bank competition in the world steadily increases 
in the period 1993-2002, but it somewhat rebounds from 2003 onwards. However, the different 
country groups exhibit very different trends. In high-income countries, market power of banks is 
on average low and stable up to 2002, but it starts increasing thereafter. This finding is in line 
                                                 
4 Various other sensitivity analyses were carried out, including use of time or country dummy variables, use of only 
one input price and estimating the cost function separately for each country. Changes in the results were not 
statistically significant, thus confirming the power of the local regression method (see also Delis and Tsionas, 2009).  
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with Bikker and Spierdijk (2008), who use the H-statistic to study changes of bank competition 
in the world. The authors attribute the initial increase in competition to the introduction of the 
euro, and the subsequent decrease to the reduced traditional intermediation of banks and 
associated increase in debt financing and other non-traditional activities. Yet, a special role to the 
upward trend towards the end of the sample period can be given to the somewhat deteriorating 
institutions in high-income countries, as reflected in the values of the institutional variables.  
In transition countries the trend is rather different. Market power of banks peaks in 1993 
(2-3 years after the initiation of the transition period) and gradually declines only after 1996. We 
may attribute this decline to the improved financial liberalization and the gradual penetration of 
foreign banks in these markets. However, the low quality of institutions may be accountable for 
the initial upward trend and the 5-6 year delay in observing any significant decline in bank 
market power. Finally, in the lower-middle and low-income countries the market power of banks 
seems to be fairly stable, but higher than that observed in high-income countries. This may again 
be attributed to the quality of institutions or to the increased risk premium observed in countries 
with less stable macroeconomic environment. In the following section we explore the specific 
potential determinants of bank market power, emphasizing the role of financial liberalization and 
institutions.      
 
3. Determinants of bank competition 
We examine the determinants of bank competition using a large panel dataset that 
includes as many countries and years as possible. Below we discuss the specific determinants of 
competition and the associated variables employed. 
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3.1. Financial liberalization 
We measure financial liberalization by employing the financial reforms index of Abiad et 
al. (2008). This index covers 91 countries in total over the period 1973-2005, whereas previous 
indices (e.g. that of Kaminsky and Schmuckler, 2003, or the European Bank for Reconstruction 
and Development [EBRD] index of banking sector reform) have smaller coverage in terms of 
years and/or countries. This makes our study the first to explore the banking competition-
financial reform nexus at such large scale. Where the datasets coincide, the correlation between 
the three different indices is very high (the correlation of the Abiad et al. index is 0.85 with the 
Kaminsky-Schmuckler and 0.88 with the EBRD indicator, respectively). The financial reforms 
index covers a wide array of reform processes and is directly comparable across countries.  
More specifically, Abiad et al. (2010) construct a composite indicator that includes seven 
pillars. Each pillar receives a score on the basis of whether the financial sector is liberalized or 
not. The seven pillars are as follows (range of scores in parentheses): credit controls and reserve 
requirements (0-4), aggregate credit ceilings (0-1), interest rate liberalization (0-4), banking 
sector entry (0-5), capital account transactions (0-3), privatization (0-3), securities markets (0-5) 
and banking sector supervision (0-6). Therefore, this index can take values from 0 to 31. In 
general, low scores indicate repressed financial sectors and high scores liberalized financial 
sectors.5 As the index principally quantifies reforms in the banking sector, we use the terms 
“financial” and “banking” reform interchangeably. The average value for the financial reforms 
index for each country is reported in Appendix B. 
                                                 
5 For the last pillar (banking supervision) a high score indicates high regulation and a low score an unregulated 
financial sector. Note that a high score for this pillar implies that the country has reformed the banking sector so that 
(i) a capital adequacy ratio is adopted, (ii) the banking supervisory agency is independent from executives’ 
influence, (iii) the banking supervisory agency conducts effective supervision through on-site and off-site 
examinations, and (iv) the banking supervisory agency covers all financial institutions without exception. This kind 
of regulation is considered as a “positive” reform (re-regulation) aiming to enhance financial stability mainly 
through the introduction of safety nets. Therefore, the value of this sub-index is added to the general score. 
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3.2. Institutional environment 
The variables IE in Eq. (1) correspond to a number of indices that assess institutional 
strength in the countries examined. We use three indices obtained from the International Country 
Risk Guide (ICRG) to proxy (i) transparency (inverse of corruption) within the political system 
(denoted as transparency), (ii) the quality of the judicial system and popular observance of law 
(law quality), and (iii) the quality of bureaucracy (bureaucratic quality). Higher values for these 
indices reflect higher institutional quality. The variables transparency and law quality take 
values between 0 and 6 (inclusive) and the variable bureaucratic quality between 0 and 4. 
Among the various databases including information on the institutional environment, the ICRG 
is the one with the best coverage. Still, for 7 countries covered by the Abiad et al. (2010) 
database, the ICRG does not include information. Thus, our final sample includes 84 countries. 
Appendix B reports country-specific averages for the institutional variables.  
The most common form of corruption, which is also relevant for our purposes, is 
financial corruption in the form of demands for special payments and bribes connected with all 
sorts of transactions. Such corruption usually makes markets less efficient and generates 
networking effects that could lead, inter alia, to anticompetitive behavior. Our measure accounts 
for various forms of corruption, such as excessive patronage, nepotism, job reservations, ‘favor-
for-favors’, secret party funding, and suspiciously close ties between politics and business. As a 
result, we expect that in countries with high corruption (low transparency) competitive 
conditions are lower, and these effects may be more pronounced for large banks with higher 
political power. 
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The variable law quality, in turn, is an assessment of the strength and impartiality of the 
legal system, as well as of popular observance of law. Therefore, a country can enjoy a high 
rating in terms of the quality of the judicial system, but a low rating if enforcement is inferior. 
These characteristics of the index are relevant for bank competition, because they reflect the 
ability of policy authorities to (i) identify various forms of anticompetitive conduct in banking 
and (ii) impose sanctions. Finally, the institutional strength and quality of bureaucracy tends to 
minimize policy discontinuity when governments change, to enhance the state’s role in 
identifying non-competitive conduct, and to safeguard the regulatory environment in an efficient 
way. Hence, both law quality and bureaucratic quality are expected to have a positive impact on 
bank competition. Again, these effects may be non-uniform across banks in the sample, as the 
impact of the institutional variables on bank market power may be reinforced by bank 
characteristics like size and access to capital. We will investigate this issue in our empirical 
analysis below.  
 
3.3. Control variables      
In Eq. (1) we control for a number of bank-specific and macroeconomic variables that 
may affect the market power of banks. In particular, we use the ratio of equity capital to total 
assets (capitalization) to control for bank capitalization and the natural logarithm of real total 
assets (bank size) to proxy bank size.6 Well-capitalized and larger banks are probably able to set 
higher margins or have access to cheaper source of funds due to scale economies, informational 
                                                 
6 We have additionally experimented with measures of bank liquidity (measured by the ratio of liquid assets to total 
assets) and credit risk (measured either by the ratio of non-performing loans to total loans or the ratio of loan loss 
provisions to total loans). However, we did not find significant changes in the results on our main variables. At the 
same time, the sample is greatly reduced when including the aforementioned variables, owing to missing data in the 
early years of our sample period. Especially for liquidity there are concerns about the direct comparability of the 
data between countries.  
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asymmetries and moral hazard issues. Also, as discussed above, larger banks could impound the 
otherwise effective role of institutions in enhancing competition. However, in relatively 
competitive markets, or in banking systems were efficient tacit collusion is in place, we do not 
expect these effects to be present. Data for these variables are obtained from Bankscope and 
country averages are reported in Appendix B. 
Concentration has been considered in the past as a measure of competition, but there is 
now consensus that it does not directly gauge banks’ competitive behavior (Claessens, 2010) and 
can be better viewed as a determinant of competition (Bikker and Haaf, 2002). Information on 
this variable is obtained from Beck and Demirguc-Kunt (2009), who also obtain bank-level data 
from Bankscope. Existing evidence on the relationship between concentration and competition is 
mixed, with some studies reporting a positive relationship (e.g. Bikker and Haaf, 2002) and other 
studies an insignificant one (e.g. Yeyati and Micco, 2007). Again, differences in the findings can 
be attributed to the institutional environment within which banks operate, along with the 
characteristics of the market. Thus, in countries with strong institutions and robust competition 
policies, a high concentration may not be associated with anticompetitive conduct. We provide 
further insights on this issue in the empirical analysis below. 
Finally, we control for the impact of the macroeconomic environment common to all 
banks in terms of (i) economic development (by including the natural logarithm of GDP per 
capita, gdp per capita), (ii) the state of the economy (using growth in GDP, GDP growth), and 
(iii) stability in the monetary conditions (by including the consumer price index, inflation). These 
macroeconomic variables are obtained from the World Development Indicators. Ideally, one may 
also want to control for elements like stock market capitalization, the importance of banking in 
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financing economic activity, etc. However, the present analysis is constrained by the availability 
of data for the early years of our dataset. 
     
4. Empirical methodology and estimation results 
4.1. Identification issues 
Two econometric concerns of the regressions of bank market power may be the dynamic 
nature of bank competition, and the potential endogeneity of some of the right-hand side 
variables. Concerning the former, Berger et al. (2000), among others, suggest that even 
developed banking systems may be characterized by informational opacity, networking, and 
relationship-lending. All these elements will cause bank rents and market power to persist. To 
account for this type of persistence in our econometric model, we include the lagged dependent 
variable among the regressors. Estimation is carried out using the system GMM estimator for 
dynamic panels put forth by Blundell and Bond (1998). Besides accounting for the specified 
dynamics, the latter estimator has two additional virtues. First, it does not break down in the 
presence of unit roots (for a proof see Binder et al., 2003); and, second, it accommodates the 
possible endogeneity between market power and some of the independent variables by means of 
appropriate instruments. In general, a value of the coefficient on the lagged dependent variable 
statistically equal to 0 implies that bank market power is characterized by high speed of 
adjustment, while a value statistically equal to 1 means that the adjustment is very slow. Values 
between 0 and 1 suggest that market power persists, but will eventually return to a normal 
(average) level. Finally, this coefficient takes implausible (negative) values if convergence to 
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equilibrium cannot be achieved, which probably indicates a problem with the dataset (e.g., very 
small time dimension of the panel).7 
The financial reforms index, the institutional variables and the bank-level variables 
should be considered as endogenous determinants of market power. Concerning the former, 
banks usually perceive financial reform and foreign bank entry as bound to happen once these 
begin, which triggers a situation of self-fulfilling expectations. Under this assumption, banks will 
price their products, and reform their risk-taking activities and associated capital levels in light of 
the forthcoming developments in the banking sector. Or it could be that banks with market power 
may even exacerbate changes that serve their own interest (especially if institutions are weak 
within a political-capitalism regime). Also, it is quite important to note that bank size is a key 
element through which financial reforms may affect the market power of banks. In particular, 
financial reforms aiming at liberalizing credit controls, interest rates and capital account 
transactions will first be adopted by the leading banks in the market. On the same line, banking 
sector entry is bound to be affected by the policies of the largest players in the market, especially 
if institutions and official supervisory power are rather weak. This is because larger banks 
usually have better access to equity capital markets, which poses (monopoly) entry restrictions to 
newcomers.8  
Given the above theoretical considerations, it could hold that the effect of financial 
liberalization differs with bank characteristics, such as size and capitalization. Therefore, besides 
exploring the direct effect of financial reforms on bank market power, we additionally adopt an 
identification strategy that involves the interaction of the financial reforms index with bank 
characteristics. In other words, even if it is hard to argue convincingly that the level effect of 
                                                 
7 For more on these issues, see Nerlove (2002). 
8 This discussion is in line with the theoretical models of Laffont (for a review, see Estache and Wren-Lewis, 2009). 
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reform on competition is causal, a significant interaction term between reforms and bank 
characteristics would be hard to explain other than through a causal effect. 
The above line of reasoning is also valid for the institutional variables. In particular, the 
effects of institutions on bank market power could be reinforced by bank size or better access to 
cheaper sources of capital. A difference here is that the institutional variables are most probably 
viewed by banks as predetermined. In general, banks observe the level of institutional strength 
and ownership in the previous period and set their interest-rate, capital and risk levels 
accordingly. This implies that a change in institutions today will affect, to the very best, market 
power of banks in the next period. Therefore, the institutional variables enter Eq. (1) lagged 
once, again easing concerns regarding possible endogeneity of these variables.  
In terms of the Blundell and Bond (1998) method, the above arguments imply that the 
variables entering the equation lagged once serve as exogenous variables, while the bank-level 
variables and the financial reforms index are strictly endogenous. In line with Bond (2002), this 
implies using only the second and third lags of the market power, bank-level and financial-
reforms variables as instruments. In contrast, the first lag of the institutional variables also serves 
as valid instrument (in addition to the second and third lags of these variables). Bearing these 
issues in mind we now turn to the discussion of our empirical results. 
 
4.2. Direct identification  
Table 2, Panel A reports the estimation results when the identification strategy does not 
involve interactions with bank characteristics. All specifications include country-specific time 
effects. The Sargan test shows that estimated equations are not overidentified. Even though some 
of the equations indicate that first-order autocorrelation (AR1) is present, this does not indicate 
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that the estimates are inconsistent. Inconsistency would be implied if second-order 
autocorrelation was present (Blundell and Bond, 1998), but this case is rejected by the test for 
AR2 errors. The values of the coefficients on the lagged dependent variable indicate persistence 
of bank market power to a moderate extent. Higher values are observed in low-income countries 
(see column 4) and this is a first indication of the relative opaqueness and rigidity of the banking 
systems in less developed countries.  
The first three specifications in Table 2 report the direct impact of financial reform and 
institutions on bank market power for the full sample. In column (3) we use an IV method, 
instead of GMM. The results in all three equations show that financial reforms lower market 
power of banks, and so do quality institutions. This is a first indication that reforms and 
institutions matter in shaping the competitive conditions in the banking sector. Therefore, so far 
the results favor both lines of argument as set out in the introduction of the paper. On the one 
hand, financial liberalization is essential in shaping the competitive conditions in the banking 
sector and, on the other, institutions are equally important.  
The effect of the rest of the control variables is in line with expectations. Larger and well-
capitalized banks are usually those possessing higher market power. This is intuitive, because 
these banks have access to cheaper sources of finance, cope better with moral hazard issues on 
the part of borrowers, and are sometimes able to impound institutions and competition policy or 
lead privatizations and M&As to monopoly outcomes. The impact of concentration on bank 
market power is positive, but statistically insignificant at the 5% level. This shows that 
concentration is generally uncorrelated with bank market power (a finding in line with Claessens 
and Laeven, 2004). It remains to examine whether this holds for different groups of countries. 
The picture shown in Figure 1 is confirmed by the regressions, with banks in less developed 
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countries possessing higher market power. Growth does not seem to play an important role in 
shaping competitive conditions in the banking sector, while in countries with high inflation 
market power of banks rises.  
In columns (4) and (5) of Panel A we examine whether results are different when 
splitting the sample into high- and low-income countries (the low-income group also includes the 
countries described as “lower-middle income”). The results on the financial reform variable are 
modified and show that, while reforms continue to exert a negative and significant impact on 
bank market power in the high-income countries, the respective impact in the low-income group 
turns insignificant at conventional levels. In contrast, the impact of the institutional variables 
remains negative for both subgroups. This shows that quality institutions contain market power 
of banks, irrespective of the level of economic development. Another notable difference between 
the results of regressions in columns (4) and (5) is that concentration has a positive effect on 
market power only in low-income countries. This is an interesting finding, as it implies that 
M&A activity where institutions are relatively weak may lead to monopoly outcomes. On the 
contrary, a higher concentration ratio in well-developed countries does not imply a significantly 
higher market power of banks. This finding is consistent with the results of Demirguc-Kunt et al. 
(2004), who suggest that concentration has a negative effect on banking system efficiency, 
except in rich countries with well-developed financial systems and higher economic freedoms. 
In column (6) we present the effect of the interaction of financial reforms with 
institutions on bank market power. Thus, we introduce multiplicative terms of all the institutional 
and the GDP per capita variables with the financial reforms index, and using the full sample. 
Given that the correlation between the level and the multiplicative terms is very high (i.e. an 
indication of multicollinearity) we mean-center the variables (i.e. we generate new variables by 
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subtracting their means). The results show that merely all the interaction terms enter the 
estimated equation with a negative and statistically significant coefficient. This implies that in 
those countries identified with low-quality institutions and subordinate economic development, 
the market power of banks is higher. Therefore, the theoretical literature highlighting the 
importance of proper institutions as a prerequisite of reforms in general, and financial 
liberalization in particular, is confirmed (Tirole, 1991; Stazinskis, 1991; Eyal et al., 1998). It 
remains to examine whether these results are validated when we choose a different identification 
scheme.    
 
4.3. Identification through bank characteristics 
In Table 2, Panel B we report the results when identification is made through bank 
characteristics. Again, we mean-center the respective variables to reduce the impact of 
multicollinearity. In general, the findings reinforce the conclusions of Section 4.2. Financial 
reforms and institutional quality are negatively correlated with market power of banks when the 
full sample is used (column 1 of Panel B) and these results carry through in both the low- and the 
high-income countries. The impact of the rest of the control variables also remains practically 
unchanged. 
The most important results reported in Panel B are those on the interaction terms between 
bank characteristics and the financial reforms and institutional variables. In particular, the 
negative effect of financial reforms and institutions on bank market power is higher for larger 
banks. This implies that financial reforms and quality institutions reduce disproportionately the 
market power of larger banks, which are the ones that usually posses market power (as also 
reflected in the positive and significant coefficient on the bank size variable). Note, however, 
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that the distributional effect of financial reforms through bank size for the low-income country 
group (column 2 of Panel B) is less significant (only at the 10% level), while the distributional 
effect of the institutional variables through bank size is clearly more important in reducing 
market power. Taken together, these findings provide another indication that financial reforms 
partially fail to materialize in enhanced competitive conditions where institutions are weak. 
Finally, it seems that financial reforms and transparency play an important role in reducing 
market power when the distributional effect concerns the capitalization variable. This is intuitive 
because liberalization policies in the financial markets, first and foremost, widen the access to 
capital markets by reducing credit ceilings and enhancing capital account transactions. In turn, 
these policies provide access to cheaper sources of capital for all banks in the industry. In 
contrast, the coefficients on the interaction terms of law and bureaucratic quality with bank 
capitalization are statistically insignificant.   
 
4.4. Other sensitivity analysis    
As a final exercise, we use the Lerner index, Litc = (pitc-mcitc)/pitc, and the 3-bank 
concentration ratio as dependent variables. The Lerner index is estimated at the bank level, using 
the local regression method described in Appendix A, and the marginal cost estimates obtained 
above to estimate the Boone indicator. We proxy the price of bank output p (i.e. the bank-level 
interest rate) using the ratio of total revenue to total earning assets (for descriptive statistics, see 
Appendix B). This measure reflects the full array of bank outputs.9 The Lerner index has a 
statistically significant correlation with the Boone indicator, which is equal to 0.462. The 
                                                 
9 Alternatively, we employ the ratio of interest income to the value of total loans. This measure is probably more 
restrictive for our purpose as it essentially measures lending rates and will reflect market power only in lending, but 
it is also the measure favored by most of the literature (see e.g. Maudos and de Guevara, 2007). 
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correlation between the 3-bank concentration ratio and the Boone indicator is as low as 0.009 
and statistically insignificant.     
The estimation results are reported in Table 3. For both measures we report equations 
with and without multiplicative terms on bank characteristics. The results on the Lerner index 
equations (columns 1-2) are in line with the results on the Boone indicator. In particular, 
financial reform and quality institutions seem to lower the market power of banks. When 
introducing interaction terms between the financial reforms index and the institutional variables, 
the results again show that financial reforms improve competition primarily in countries with 
quality institutions (these results are not reported, but are available on request). Combined with 
the high correlation with the Boone indicator, these findings show that the Lerner index is still a 
valuable indicator of market power.10 
In contrast, the results on the concentration equations are qualitatively and quantitatively 
different. The most notable finding is that enhanced financial liberalization increases 
concentration. This effect can be attributed to the significant wave of mergers and acquisitions 
that occurred in many banking systems worldwide following the liberalization policies. In 
addition, this effect is lower for large and well-capitalized banks, implying that in banking 
sectors with relatively few large banks, financial reforms help smaller and less capitalized banks 
to enter the market. All in all, the results on banking industry concentration show that 
concentration is quite a different notion than competition, at least in the banking sector (see also 
Claessens and Laeven, 2004; Schaeck and Cihak, 2010).       
 
 
                                                 
10 This analysis makes the present study the first to compare the Boone indicator estimates with the Lerner index for 
such an extensive panel of banks.  
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5. Conclusions 
In this paper we explore the determinants of bank-level market power, placing an 
emphasis on financial reforms and the quality of institutions. To this end, we use a panel dataset 
of banks from 84 countries, and we estimate market power by elaborating on the newly 
established method of Boone (2008). Effectively, this provides a new global index of the 
competitive conditions in the banking sectors. Our empirical findings confirm the importance of 
institutional quality, in terms of a positive relationship with bank competition. Thus, institutional 
endowment is vital for the enhancement of competition following a period of financial 
liberalization policies. In particular, transparency, the rule of law and bureaucratic quality are 
negatively related with bank market power; and when these suffer financial reforms partially fail 
to deliver more competitive conditions in the banking markets.  
Evidently, well-performing and transparent legal and bureaucratic institutions in the high 
income countries allow market competition to emerge as a direct aftermath of sectoral 
liberalization of the 1980s and 1990s. In contrast, competition procrastinated when the same 
policies of banking liberalization were applied in relative underdeveloped countries. Thus, 
sectoral reform in transition economies does not produce the same efficiency gains as in 
developed economies until it is backed up by well-functioning institutions. These findings are 
robust across a number of robustness checks and identification methods. An interesting extension 
to this paper involves examining which of the components of the financial reforms index are the 
most important as competition-enhancing mechanisms. We leave this and other questions to be 
answered by future research. 
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Appendix A. The local regression method 
A thorough discussion of local regression (LR) is provided in Loader (1999); here we 
only provide a basic analysis. LR estimation is a consistent way to allow for nonparametric 
effects within the parametric model, and this is accomplished as follows. The underlying model 
for local regression is ( )i i iY xμ ε= + , where x are predictor variables and Y is the response 
variable. The unknown function μ(x) is assumed to be smooth and is estimated by fitting a 
polynomial model (a quadratic in our case, as in most of the literature) within a local sliding 
window. Therefore, no strong assumptions are made about μ globally, but locally around x we 
assume that μ can be well-approximated. Note that this not a strong assumption when using large 
and rich datasets like the one of the present analysis. For a fitting point x, define a bandwidth h 
that controls the smoothness of the fit and a smoothing window (x-h(x), x+h(x)). To estimate μ, 
only observations within this sliding window are used. Therefore, for each fitting point a locally 
weighted least squares criterion of the following form is considered: 
( )20 1
1
( ( ))
n
i
i i
i
x xW Y a a x x
h=
−⎛ ⎞ − + −⎜ ⎟⎝ ⎠∑ , (A.1) 
where W is the weight function that assigns largest weights to observations close to x, and takes 
the form  
3 3(1 )  if 1( )
0             otherwise
u uW u
⎧ − <⎪= ⎨⎪⎩
. (A.2) 
The local least squares criterion of Eq. (A.1) is minimized to produce estimates 0aˆ  and 1aˆ  for 
each observation.  
This discussion relates to the bivariate local regression. The multivariate local regression 
simply adds further terms to the right hand-side of the formula for Y and forms accordingly the 
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associated Eq. (A.1). Estimations were carried out using the program Locfit. An important issue 
in the implementation of LR is the choice of an optimal bandwidth. Many alternatives have been 
proposed, like plug-in methods and cross-validation (see Kumbhakar et al., 2007). Here we used 
the generalized cross-validation method (see Loader, 1999), which in our case yields a 
bandwidth equal to 0.701. For other applications of local methods to bank data, see e.g. 
Kumbhakar et al. (2007) and Delis and Tsionas (2009). 
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Appendix B.  Information on the dataset 
 
Table B1  
Sample coverage and averages of country-level variables 
Country 
Income  
and country 
group 
Sample No. of observ. 
Financial 
reform 
Range of 
financial 
reform 
Corruption Law quality 
Bureauc. 
quality 
GDP 
growth Concent. 
GDP per 
capita Inflation 
Albania LMI-T 1992-2005 101 11.64 3.75-18 2.66 2.80 1.25 5.71 0.83 1,091.07 30.31 
Algeria LMI-MENA 1994-2005 147 10.69 8.5-11.25 2.12 2.46 1.70 3.59 0.85 1,820.12 8.72 
Argentina HMI-LA 1989-2005 1,222 14.24 6-15 2.92 3.84 2.50 2.86 0.45 7,170.30 332.96 
Australia HI 1992-2005 388 20.21 17-21 4.89 5.99 4.00 3.54 0.67 20,001.39 2.44 
Austria HI 1988-2005 744 15.22 7.5-19.5 4.78 6.00 3.99 2.47 0.75 21,742.80 2.29 
Azerbaijan LMI-T 1992-2005 144 10.43 6-16 1.95 3.96 1.00 1.91 0.88 713.40 297.04 
Bangladesh LI-E 1992-2005 461 9.21 8-11 1.69 2.22 1.53 5.13 0.58 322.63 5.28 
Belarus UMI-T 1992-2005 129 9.64 5.5-11.5 2.77 4.00 1.00 2.16 0.83 1,274.16 379.46 
Belgium HI 1988-2005 988 18.57 11.25-21 4.26 5.49 4.00 2.28 0.77 20,841.10 2.16 
Bolivia LMI-LA 1993-2005 193 17.00 15-19 2.60 2.86 1.61 3.95 0.52 997.35 5.68 
Brazil UMI-LA 1991-2005 1,815 9.60 6-12 3.07 2.62 2.44 2.64 0.51 3,630.66 369.04 
Bulgaria UMI-T 1991-2005 233 11.98 5.75-17.25 3.35 4.43 2.00 0.71 0.74 1,611.35 126.60 
Burkina-Faso LI-SSA 1996-2005 116 12.60 10-13 2.15 3.81 1.00 6.43 0.77 228.91 2.74 
Cameroon LMI-SSA 1994-2005 162 11.60 4.75-13 2.05 2.43 1.32 4.53 0.71 674.34 2.97 
Canada HI 1988-2005 1,024 20.11 17-21 5.67 6.00 4.00 2.77 0.54 21,522.28 2.52 
Chile UMI-LA 1988-2005 235 16.56 15-19 3.42 4.65 2.52 5.96 0.56 4,309.98 9.23 
China LMI-E 1988-2005 1,417 4.92 0.75-10.25 2.78 4.33 2.09 9.53 0.74 783.40 6.75 
Colombia LMI-LA 1989-2005 422 12.29 2-15 2.59 1.35 2.47 3.21 0.49 2,387.07 17.00 
Costa Rica UMI-LA 1991-2005 542 9.40 5-11 4.31 4.00 2.03 4.88 0.73 3,823.85 14.43 
Czech Rep HI-T 1991-2005 192 15.53 7.75-19.25 3.61 5.28 3.00 1.49 0.73 5,412.60 9.89 
Denmark HI 1988-2005 1,147 19.85 16.25-21 5.86 6.00 4.00 1.90 0.79 27,394.07 2.40 
Dominican Rep LMI-LA 1992-2005 618 11.61 10.25-14.25 3.07 3.27 1.40 5.57 0.65 2,475.83 11.45 
Ecuador LMI-LA 1997-2005 380 13.89 13-12 2.87 3.11 2.00 3.31 0.65 1,398.40 30.92 
Egypt LMI-MENA 1988-2005 419 10.72 0-15 2.28 3.41 2.00 4.26 0.66 1,289.22 9.56 
El Salvador LMI-LA 1995-2005 155 15.91 13.5-16 3.22 2.88 1.77 3.00 0.81 2,193.80 4.23 
Estonia HI-T 1993-2005 139 18.62 9.25-21 3.77 4.00 2.67 5.30 0.91 4,064.01 17.94 
Finland HI 1988-2005 594 16.47 15-17 6.00 3.84 3.97 2.44 0.95 21,315.59 2.36 
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France HI 1987-2005 1,304 19.37 16-21 4.27 6.00 3.72 2.22 0.59 20,163.36 2.09 
Germany HI 1991-2005 9855 18.73 17-19 4.96 5.54 4.00 1.61 0.61 22,028.15 2.00 
Ghana LI-SSA 1995-2005 132 9.55 7-12 2.50 2.45 2.23 4.63 0.89 257.51 26.21 
Greece HI 1988-2005 485 14.39 5.75-18 4.43 4.04 2.84 2.93 0.86 10,957.88 8.81 
Guatemala LMI-LA 1992-2005 380 13.21 8-16 2.65 2.23 1.42 3.76 0.34 1,655.83 8.30 
Hong Kong HI-E 1992-2005 443 19.36 18-20 4.07 4.96 3.09 3.93 0.62 25,110.35 2.63 
Hungary HI-T 1990-2005 275 15.73 7.5-20.25 4.36 4.95 3.51 1.67 0.69 4,443.23 16.32 
India LMI-E 1992-2005 898 9.36 3-13 2.57 3.89 3.00 6.33 0.36 435.05 6.90 
Indonesia LMI-E 1990-2005 957 12.19 11-14 1.79 2.98 1.84 4.81 0.55 804.86 12.24 
Ireland HI 1992-2005 506 20.86 19-21 3.68 5.83 4.00 6.95 0.65 22,332.49 3.05 
Israel HI 1990-2005 182 16.00 11-19 3.98 4.58 3.79 4.72 0.78 17,947.44 7.62 
Italy HI 1987-2005 1,498 15.95 9-20 3.33 5.07 3.05 1.75 0.60 17,813.22 3.79 
Jamaica UMI-LA 2002-2005 33 15.00 15-15 1.60 1.53 3.00 2.11 0.82 3,668.20 11.58 
Japan HI 1988-2005 9,238 16.39 12-18 4.10 5.42 3.98 2.02 0.38 35,510.57 0.68 
Jordan LMI-MENA 1992-2005 165 17.55 14.75-19.25 3.51 4.20 2.22 5.89 0.88 1,790.81 2.80 
Kazakhstan UMI-T 1996-2005 158 12.78 11.25-13 1.94 4.00 2.00 6.47 0.66 1,394.28 12.03 
Kenya LI-SSA 1992-2005 402 12.64 7.5-15.5 2.48 2.68 2.40 2.55 0.60 411.60 13.27 
Korea HI-E 1991-2005 398 14.80 14-15 3.65 4.42 3.19 5.63 0.36 10,549.78 4.52 
Latvia UMI-T 1992-2005 315 17.89 6.5-21 2.40 4.89 2.33 2.40 0.53 3,214.09 33.50 
Lithuania UMI-T 1992-2005 112 14.95 3.75-19.25 2.70 4.00 2.33 1.16 0.80 3,350.89 113.37 
Madagascar LI-SSA 1994-2005 88 14.56 10.75-16.25 3.97 2.73 1.00 2.82 0.79 244.75 16.19 
Malaysia UMI-E 1993-2005 612 15.08 16-17 3.26 3.98 2.77 5.98 0.43 3,915.04 2.70 
Mexico UMI-LA 1989-2005 719 16.47 10-20 2.66 2.67 2.50 3.17 0.67 5,453.37 15.19 
Morocco LMI-MENA 1992-2005 116 12.36 5-14 2.96 5.48 2.00 3.10 0.64 1,293.17 2.76 
Mozambique LI-SSA 1996-2005 105 14.40 11.5-15 2.63 3.00 0.68 8.06 0.81 249.37 13.20 
Netherlands HI 1988-2005 752 20.00 19-21 5.77 6.00 4.00 2.80 0.72 21,611.85 2.28 
New Zealand HI 1996-2005 122 20.00 20-20 5.26 5.95 4.00 3.30 0.78 13,482.41 1.96 
Nicaragua LMI-LA 1992-2005 131 11.93 2.5-15.25 3.94 3.60 1.00 3.08 0.63 741.59 6.70 
Nigeria LI-SSA 1992-2005 488 14.27 10.75-17 1.49 2.55 1.26 3.86 0.53 376.39 26.54 
Norway HI 1989-2005 490 17.37 16.25-18.25 5.44 6.00 3.84 3.01 0.90 34,099.23 2.40 
Pakistan LI-MENA 1992-2005 428 9.79 6-12 2.02 2.90 2.00 4.26 0.62 531.82 7.61 
Paraguay LMI-LA 1992-2005 316 15.29 12.5-16.5 1.79 3.23 1.39 2.04 0.45 1,392.55 11.04 
Peru LMI-LA 1992-2005 320 17.95 12.25-19 2.87 2.85 1.60 4.24 0.66 2,008.64 14.38 
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Philippines LMI-E 1990-2005 566 14.55 9.5-17 2.54 2.79 1.98 3.52 0.79 947.79 7.55 
Poland UMI-T 1992-2005 421 15.38 9.75-18.5 3.75 4.80 3.06 4.37 0.60 4,072.51 15.81 
Portugal HI 1988-2005 640 15.47 10.75-17.5 4.62 5.13 2.84 2.85 0.70 9,782.79 5.58 
Romania UMI-T 1997-2005 214 15.36 13.25-18.5 2.68 4.23 1.00 2.06 0.70 1,853.74 44.28 
Russia UMI-T 1993-2005 5,645 14.83 9.5-17 1.93 3.46 1.35 1.10 0.43 1,844.13 126.99 
Senegal LI-SSA 1993-2005 135 13.08 11-15 2.85 2.82 1.35 3.90 0.74 467.68 4.16 
Singapore HI-E 1991-2005 181 18.40 17-20 4.14 5.59 3.78 6.57 0.83 20,782.22 1.37 
South Africa UMI-SSA 1991-2005 454 16.32 11.25-18.25 3.78 2.50 2.78 2.52 0.89 3,059.12 7.44 
Spain HI 1988-2005 1725 19.14 14.5-21 4.15 4.76 3.26 3.23 0.73 13,002.83 4.08 
Sri Lanka LMI-E 1992-2005 244 12.36 9.25-15 3.35 2.95 2.00 4.83 0.72 804.70 9.59 
Sweden HI 1988-2005 710 19.67 18-20 5.83 6.00 4.00 2.20 0.92 25,479.29 2.97 
Switzerland HI 1988-2005 5,464 19.06 18-20 5.35 5.77 4.00 1.60 0.86 33,408.86 1.90 
Tanzania LI-SSA 2004-2005 35 17.00 17-17 2.00 5.00 1.00 7.05 0.61 323.41 4.89 
Thailand LMI-E 1988-2005 519 12.36 6.25-13 2.46 4.34 2.77 6.03 0.58 1,848.34 3.99 
Tunisia LMI-MENA 1992-2005 185 12.54 4.75-15 2.71 4.75 2.00 4.70 0.48 1,939.38 3.57 
Turkey UMI-MENA 1988-2005 594 13.53 7.5-15.5 2.66 3.74 2.31 4.04 0.72 3,738.33 61.65 
Uganda LI-SSA 1993-2005 316 13.35 8.5-15.5 2.27 3.94 1.65 6.92 0.66 244.37 4.91 
UK HI 1988-2005 1543 20.50 20-21 4.88 5.65 4.00 2.54 0.69 22,926.57 3.60 
Ukraine LMI-T 1993-2005 427 11.98 6.75-14.5 1.86 4.00 1.00 -1.54 0.67 737.49 477.01 
Uruguay UMI-LA 1992.2005 460 15.14 14-15 3.00 2.85 1.72 2.39 0.59 6,620.89 23.61 
USA HI 1988-2005 16,752 19.78 18-21 4.60 5.81 4.00 3.01 0.22 31,632.31 3.06 
Venezuela UMI-LA 1988-2005 715 14.29 4.5-17.25 2.67 3.56 1.53 2.28 0.57 4,909.13 39.35 
Vietnam LI-T 1992-2005 85 5.93 1.75-9.5 2.22 4.36 1.81 7.68 0.86 379.34 4.12 
Zimbabwe LI-SSA 1993-2005 188 12.38 9.5-11.75 1.77 2.85 2.32 -0.90 0.76 585.45 114.75 
Total mean   84768 14.86  3.46 4.16 2.60 3.58 0.67 8,900.87 36.19 
Notes: For the column “income and country group” the abbreviations read HI: high income; UMI: upper-middle income; LMI: lower-middle income; LI: low income; T: 
transition; MENA: Middle East and North Africa; LA: Latin America; E: emerging; SSA: Sub-Saharan Africa. For the rest of the columns the abbreviations read No. of 
observ.: Number of observations; Bureauc. quality: Bureaucratic quality; Concent.: 3-bank concentration ratio. GDP per capita is in million $US. 
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Table B2  
Averages for the bank-level variables by country 
Country c q d p w1 w2 Capital. Bank size 
Albania  17,673 184,819 281,161 0.25 0.01 1.18 0.15 11.85 
Algeria  91,755 1,569,639 1,941,107 0.15 0.01 1.46 0.15 13.37 
Argentina 125,303 667,329 604,121 0.30 0.05 3.38 0.25 12.19 
Australia 2,352,223 32,610,134 21,056,247 0.13 0.01 3.69 0.12 15.55 
Austria 212,934 3,189,420 2,811,961 0.18 0.02 3.90 0.10 12.84 
Azerbaijan 57,261 405,147 543,160 0.43 0.02 1.35 0.22 10.79 
Bangladesh 53,098 558,625 528,866 0.13 0.01 2.85 0.07 12.86 
Belarus 73,674 435,833 468,801 0.39 0.03 1.27 0.23 11.92 
Belgium 2,092,800 2,4207,213 21,906,234 0.19 0.01 3.09 0.16 14.12 
Bolivia 31,400 277,432 266,010 0.12 0.02 2.72 0.20 12.07 
Brazil 763,752 3,581,466 2,102,176 0.51 0.02 1.89 0.21 13.35 
Bulgaria 37,569 442,989 521,364 0.25 0.01 1.28 0.16 12.46 
Burkina-Faso 12,775 109,303 124,534 0.14 0.02 1.36 0.09 11.71 
Cameroon 16,722 174,027 233,059 0.15 0.02 1.19 0.08 12.18 
Canada 1,279,017 15,606,783 17,012,452 0.27 0.02 2.97 0.15 14.09 
Chile 258,732 2,157,396 1,884,710 0.30 0.02 1.98 0.20 13.49 
China 1,166,485 30,514,633 30,735,216 0.06 0.01 1.92 0.08 15.10 
Colombia 266,831 1,727,364 1,672,315 0.24 0.03 2.07 0.12 13.82 
Costa Rica 38,953 249,279 245,030 0.41 0.04 2.24 0.20 11.15 
Czech Rep 209,038 3,070,848 3,760,435 0.14 0.01 2.56 0.11 14.36 
Denmark 245,828 4,325,073 2,683,428 0.11 0.02 4.21 0.14 12.93 
Dominican Rep 44,379 224,356 225,250 0.29 0.04 2.96 0.17 10.71 
Ecuador 28,638 183,949 213,495 0.26 0.02 2.79 0.07 10.83 
Egypt 256,735 2,223,615 2,862,343 0.14 0.01 2.45 0.10 14.15 
El Salvador 55,008 637,057 534,025 0.12 0.02 3.19 0.18 12.72 
Estonia 139,164 2,377,942 2,404,605 0.18 0.02 1.88 0.15 13.04 
Finland 1,036,163 18,023,568 14,447,288 0.14 0.03 3.92 0.17 15.34 
France 1,332,399 16,462,742 14,459,377 0.15 0.02 4.45 0.12 14.63 
Germany 149,962 2,217,411 2,079,878 0.12 0.02 2.83 0.07 13.13 
Ghana 20,315 118,517 131,083 0.36 0.03 1.63 0.14 11.21 
Greece 868,380 11,855,782 11,234,186 0.19 0.01 1.47 0.11 15.26 
Guatemala 35,108 352,008 375,916 0.17 0.02 1.64 0.12 12.07 
Hong Kong 561,661 12,431,545 14,786,527 0.18 0.01 5.89 0.20 14.63 
Hungary 263,962 2,196,173 2,219,706 0.32 0.02 2.72 0.14 13.55 
India 597,598 7,298,022 6,540,605 0.11 0.01 1.64 0.09 14.82 
Indonesia 193,295 1,462,844 1,631,781 0.19 0.01 1.78 0.14 13.27 
Ireland 1,034,095 20,100,467 15,096,238 0.17 0.01 4.61 0.11 15.82 
Israel 1,025,055 13,105,566 12,831,748 0.11 0.01 2.32 0.07 15.61 
Italy 276,002 4,357,174 3,329,934 0.12 0.02 4.59 0.13 13.09 
Jamaica 108,064 865,808 592,906 0.23 0.03 2.93 0.16 13.23 
Japan 427,160 18,905,061 15,961,430 0.04 0.01 1.77 0.06 14.50 
Jordan 239,519 3,173,771 4,280,164 0.12 0.01 1.23 0.11 14.36 
Kazakhstan 200,177 1,164,502 997,100 0.18 0.02 1.55 0.22 12.77 
Kenya 24,945 169,774 200,326 0.20 0.03 2.04 0.18 11.55 
Korea 2,378,464 37,621,755 25,710,409 0.09 0.01 2.36 0.06 16.44 
Latvia 47,684 640,678 664,384 0.28 0.01 2.04 0.11 12.75 
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Lithuania 71,997 1,210,696 1,322,538 0.31 0.02 1.22 0.10 13.40 
Madagascar 9,098 81,237 141,967 0.18 0.01 1.89 0.10 11.79 
Malaysia 536,073 5,389,672 6,129,749 0.12 0.01 4.79 0.15 14.75 
Mexico 887,872 4,839,824 5,010,343 0.36 0.04 1.58 0.21 13.99 
Morocco 302,007 5,594,582 6,199,662 0.08 0.01 0.66 0.08 15.35 
Mozambique 23,501 101,851 181,006 0.36 0.04 1.49 0.14 11.34 
Netherlands 3,027,490 50,503,881 42,617,785 1.78 0.02 4.26 0.14 15.45 
New Zealand 1,060,277 13,645,488 10,332,742 9.44 0.01 4.58 0.05 15.95 
Nicaragua 28,562 207,066 209,407 0.05 0.02 1.86 0.06 11.76 
Nigeria 99,089 458,024 750,970 0.80 0.03 1.43 0.15 12.69 
Norway 156,882 2,863,654 1,942,913 0.07 0.01 3.33 0.10 12.91 
Pakistan 118,066 1,463,279 1,521,860 0.10 0.01 1.69 0.11 13.69 
Paraguay 74,454 99,499 108,160 0.36 0.03 1.73 0.13 11.63 
Peru 245,215 2,179,336 2,358,920 0.27 0.02 1.77 0.13 13.50 
Philippines 110,924 1,240,971 1,327,389 0.14 0.02 3.01 0.17 13.02 
Poland 224,325 2,569,029 2,791,207 0.19 0.02 3.09 0.13 13.94 
Portugal 740,777 10,503,901 7,671,289 0.21 0.01 2.86 0.12 14.85 
Romania 137,809 919,993 1,230,846 0.31 0.03 1.84 0.15 13.07 
Russia 50,474 369,620 350,661 0.79 0.04 2.46 0.22 10.76 
Senegal 16,598 182,820 198,940 0.12 0.02 1.32 0.10 11.90 
Singapore 703,414 14,981,655 18,834,257 0.27 0.02 9.04 0.29 14.56 
South Africa 1,231,529 10,304,488 11,256,277 0.45 0.03 4.83 0.22 14.11 
Spain 834,332 15,421,583 9,731,326 2.28 0.01 3.16 0.13 14.35 
Sri Lanka 90,064 568,928 654,389 0.18 0.02 1.26 0.08 12.83 
Sweden 247,862 5,179,678 3,387,436 0.09 0.02 4.64 0.14 11.89 
Switzerland 361,010 2,877,707 4,339,340 0.20 0.02 2.98 0.11 12.45 
Tanzania 10,893 72,393 108,081 0.25 0.02 1.61 0.13 11.12 
Thailand 405,521 7,252,971 7,299,515 0.07 0.01 1.46 0.13 15.08 
Tunisia 83,153 908,724 851,027 0.20 0.02 1.73 0.12 13.41 
Turkey 939,710 6,088,329 5,714,579 0.39 0.02 2.70 0.22 14.31 
Uganda 10,306 67,494 64,046 0.28 0.03 2.03 0.15 11.10 
UK 2,206,587 35,814,569 32,412,140 0.09 0.02 7.42 0.17 14.24 
Ukraine 78,351 516,438 539,415 0.29 0.02 1.35 0.15 12.47 
Uruguay 295,691 252,402 360,737 0.26 0.04 2.54 0.21 11.60 
USA 1,018,557 13,800,000 8,664,069 0.12 0.02 6.84 0.11 14.40 
Venezuela 143,799 980,751 1,126,651 0.46 0.03 2.53 0.23 12.83 
Vietnam 479,339 7,626,395 6,218,222 0.42 0.02 1.23 0.08 13.34 
Zimbabwe 109,872 362,954 276,886 0.87 0.03 0.35 0.17 12.14 
Total mean 451,419 6,330,199 5,588,450 0.39 0.02 2.62 0.14 13.26 
Notes: The table presents descriptive statistics of the bank-level variables used in the empirical analysis. The 
variables are defined as follows. c: real total expenses (proxy of bank cost); q: real total earning assets (proxy 
of bank output); d: real total deposits and short-term funding; p: total revenue/total earning assets (proxy of 
the price of bank output); w1: personnel expenses/total assets (price of labor); w2: total depreciation and other 
capital expenses/total fixed assets (proxy for the price of physical capital; capital: equity capital/total assets 
(proxy for bank capitalization); bank size: natural logarithm of real total assets (proxy for bank size). c, q and 
d are in thousand $US. 
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Table 1 
Estimates of bank market power using the Boone method (country and year averages) 
 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 Mean 
Albania       -4.83 -4.78 -5.42 -4.73 -4.38 -2.76 -2.55 -2.67 -3.73 -4.92 -4.92 -5.47 -5.18 -4.76 -4.36 
Algeria          -5.21 -4.03 -4.77 -4.77 -4.98 -5.35 -4.96 -4.64 -4.82 -4.15 -4.72 -3.65 -4.67 
Argentina   0.30 -3.20 -2.81 -4.01 -4.60 -5.95 -7.38 -7.19 -6.71 -6.51 -6.13 -5.83 -5.51 -8.79 -7.58 -6.61 -3.32 -5.40 
Australia      -3.08 -3.67 -3.91 -3.78 -3.49 -3.95 -3.80 -3.75 -3.68 -3.80 -3.35 -3.12 -3.02 -2.51 -3.49 
Austria  -2.38 -2.29 -2.45 -2.51 -2.10 -2.98 -3.00 -2.96 -2.99 -3.19 -2.75 -2.36 -2.91 -3.13 -3.40 -2.74 -3.17 -2.68 -2.78 
Azerbaijan      4.70 3.15 2.66 3.61 5.58 1.24 1.58 -0.40 -1.94 -2.01 -0.56 -0.88 0.18 -0.68 1.16 
Bangladesh      -4.22 -4.66 -4.81 -4.63 -4.27 -4.46 -4.50 -4.81 -4.54 -4.39 -4.61 -4.71 -4.89 -4.80 -4.59 
Belarus      0.94 0.07 0.66 0.77 -0.66 0.94 -0.95 0.89 0.52 -0.86 0.44 -1.47 -2.04 -2.15 -0.21 
Belgium  -4.28 -4.35 -4.73 -5.09 -5.39 -5.60 -5.67 -5.70 -5.58 -5.66 -5.54 -5.12 -5.21 -4.89 -4.47 -3.83 -3.72 -3.68 -4.92 
Bolivia       -7.19 -4.13 -3.58 -3.85 -3.85 -3.74 -3.50 -4.12 -4.16 -4.11 -3.86 -4.03 -3.85 -4.15 
Brazil     -4.92 -4.15 -4.40 -3.00 -3.32 -3.22 -3.72 -3.70 -3.19 -3.43 -3.35 -3.35 -3.32 -3.52 -3.63 -3.61 
Bulgaria     -2.26 -4.27 -3.33 -3.46 -1.86 1.36 0.50 -1.05 -2.41 -2.08 -3.33 -4.10 -4.02 -3.55 -3.58 -2.50 
Burkina-Faso          -0.58 -2.38 -2.04 -2.69 -2.83 -2.28 -1.45 -1.79 -3.32 -3.28 -2.26 
Cameroon        -8.36 -8.04 -8.61 -3.63 -2.55 -2.40 -4.55 -2.80 -3.08 -3.16 -3.11 -3.77 -4.51 
Canada  -3.01 -2.86 -3.40 -3.76 -3.23 -3.07 -3.83 -4.71 -4.60 -4.71 -4.79 -4.75 -4.82 -3.75 -4.40 -4.07 -3.42 -4.63 -3.99 
Chile  -2.25 -1.14 -0.19 -2.44 -3.12 -3.41 -3.67 -3.50 -3.67 -3.75 -3.46 -3.08 -3.74 -3.22 -2.74 -3.65 -3.31 -3.45 -2.99 
China  -7.77 -6.58 -6.52 -6.40 -6.02 -6.93 -6.89 -6.81 -6.89 -6.95 -6.16 -6.55 -6.91 -6.90 -6.26 -6.39 -6.31 -7.05 -6.68 
Colombia   -0.73 0.26 0.61 -1.47 -1.08 -1.55 -2.28 -2.39 -2.92 -4.28 -6.63 -5.31 -4.21 -3.77 -3.23 -3.07 -2.81 -2.64 
Costa Rica     -1.59 -1.09 -1.02 -0.60 -0.62 -0.44 -1.49 -3.11 -3.05 -2.34 -2.29 -2.13 -1.80 -1.85 -1.71 -1.68 
Czech Rep     -1.65 -2.73 -3.61 -3.29 -3.52 -5.59 -4.72 -4.82 -4.62 -4.57 -4.23 -4.27 -4.23 -4.67 -3.93 -4.03 
Denmark  -2.19 -1.86 -1.98 -2.27 -4.90 -1.76 -2.32 -2.06 -2.23 -2.43 -2.80 -2.80 -2.95 -2.76 -2.73 -2.32 -2.37 -1.73 -2.45 
Dominican Rep      -2.46 -1.66 0.69 -0.58 -1.57 -2.25 -1.57 -1.69 -2.24 -2.85 -0.01 1.14 3.02 0.80 -0.80 
Ecuador           -3.08 -2.24 -4.58 -5.97 -5.90 -5.10 -5.34 -4.98 -4.12 -4.59 
Egypt  -3.16 -2.84 -3.02 -3.24 -4.29 -4.37 -4.13 -4.11 -4.21 -4.21 -4.08 -4.01 -4.31 -4.44 -4.68 -4.64 -4.68 -4.91 -4.07 
El Salvador         -1.61 -1.71 -2.34 -1.82 -3.03 -2.45 -1.81 -1.54 -2.01 -2.44 -2.08 -2.08 
Estonia       1.99 -0.31 -0.20 -1.30 -2.63 -3.88 -1.70 -2.00 -1.71 -2.10 -2.21 -2.25 -2.25 -1.58 
Finland  -2.86 -2.94 -2.94 -2.38 -2.13 -2.81 -2.93 -2.51 -1.75 -1.63 -1.43 -1.25 -1.87 -1.20 -1.98 -2.04 -2.15 -2.39 -2.18 
France -3.19 -2.82 -2.99 -3.11 -3.55 -4.33 -4.77 -4.93 -4.82 -5.03 -5.03 -4.57 -4.42 -4.22 -4.41 -4.55 -4.72 -4.25 -4.20 -4.21 
Germany     -4.00 -4.55 -4.47 -4.56 -4.63 -4.60 -4.33 -3.89 -4.10 -3.46 -4.29 -4.05 -4.02 -4.23 -3.83 -4.20 
Ghana         -2.16 -0.58 -3.03 -3.81 -1.80 -0.99 -0.72 -0.25 0.91 0.56 -0.49 -1.12 
Greece  -1.36 -1.96 -1.51 -2.39 -2.61 -1.15 -1.89 -1.80 -1.12 -1.07 -1.72 -1.48 -1.44 -1.52 -1.39 -1.39 -1.56 -1.80 -1.62 
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Guatemala      -3.29 -3.31 -3.60 -3.89 -3.38 -3.23 -2.80 -2.75 -3.16 -3.55 -3.60 -6.57 -4.77 -1.81 -3.55 
Hong Kong      -0.65 -0.13 -0.25 -0.39 -0.84 -0.42 -0.21 -0.37 -0.41 -1.82 -1.30 -0.95 -1.37 -2.04 -0.80 
Hungary    -1.55 -1.61 -1.20 -1.44 -2.80 -2.02 -3.05 -3.71 -3.78 -4.59 -3.34 -2.69 -2.73 -2.66 -2.52 -2.51 -2.64 
India      -5.21 -5.24 -4.73 -4.68 -4.70 -4.79 -5.06 -4.99 -5.10 -5.08 -5.01 -4.61 -4.97 -4.74 -4.92 
Indonesia    -0.91 -0.88 -0.74 -0.33 -0.70 -0.90 -0.17 -1.01 -0.98 -0.98 -0.34 -0.38 -0.19 -0.91 -0.03 0.35 -0.57 
Ireland      -3.62 -2.90 -4.26 -4.07 -4.38 -4.65 -4.51 -4.58 -4.64 -4.57 -5.58 -5.53 -4.59 -5.11 -4.50 
Israel    -2.52 -2.78 -3.50 -3.24 -3.35 -3.74 -3.62 -3.43 -3.65 -3.84 -4.56 -3.75 -4.15 -3.84 -3.77 -3.67 -3.59 
Italy -2.38 -3.14 -3.08 -3.16 -3.20 -3.33 -3.53 -4.04 -4.09 -4.29 -4.35 -4.24 -3.85 -3.02 -4.65 -5.37 -4.75 -5.14 -5.49 -3.85 
Jamaica                -1.76 -0.67 -1.17 -0.81 -1.10 
Japan  -5.11 -5.36 -5.66 -5.67 -5.94 -5.99 -5.96 -6.09 -5.88 -6.14 -6.19 -6.07 -6.04 -6.04 -5.87 -5.74 -5.72 -5.58 -5.84 
Jordan      -3.12 -3.47 -2.82 -2.57 -2.65 -2.88 -2.88 -3.04 -2.95 -2.81 -3.11 -2.68 -2.45 -2.10 -2.82 
Kazakhstan          -0.49 1.52 0.36 -0.72 -1.65 -1.42 -1.80 -1.52 -2.48 -2.20 -1.04 
Kenya      -4.07 -4.26 -4.27 -2.04 -2.55 -2.53 -1.96 -2.29 -2.55 -2.00 -1.96 -2.49 -1.81 -2.57 -2.67 
Korea     -5.18 -4.94 -5.28 -5.57 -5.74 -5.77 -6.56 -7.31 -6.23 -5.90 -5.08 -5.01 -4.62 -4.32 -4.52 -5.44 
Latvia      0.58 0.83 -0.66 -1.79 -2.45 -1.34 -2.18 -2.00 -1.74 -2.89 -2.12 -2.18 -2.31 -3.52 -1.70 
Lithuania      0.61 6.83 -2.25 -4.26 -2.53 -3.72 -2.04 -1.87 -2.73 -3.54 -3.39 -3.39 -3.56 -3.64 -2.11 
Madagascar        0.61 1.47 -0.68 -1.72 -1.39 -0.45 -0.18 -0.52 -0.81 -0.13 -0.24 0.15 -0.32 
Malaysia       -4.93 -4.90 -4.47 -4.45 -4.53 -4.99 -4.63 -4.19 -4.60 -4.90 -4.88 -4.82 -4.58 -4.68 
Mexico   -0.09 -0.79 -1.64 -1.47 -2.21 -2.92 -1.64 -2.82 -3.95 -3.44 -2.94 -3.07 -1.84 -2.97 -1.97 -2.48 -0.69 -2.17 
Morocco      -4.28 -1.99 -2.28 -2.27 -2.04 -2.60 -3.10 -3.85 -3.71 -3.46 -3.46 -3.43 -3.42 -4.08 -3.14 
Mozambique          0.08 -1.70 0.63 -4.59 -5.79 1.02 -2.19 -0.35 -0.01 -1.38 -1.43 
Netherlands  -4.25 -4.87 -4.77 -4.81 -5.25 -3.58 -3.97 -4.07 -3.99 -3.76 -3.52 -2.61 -2.68 -3.34 -5.22 -4.18 -4.02 -3.80 -4.01 
New Zealand          -0.04 -0.72 -0.92 -1.04 -0.96 -1.08 -0.92 -1.03 -0.28 -0.36 -0.74 
Nicaragua      -1.08 -0.86 -2.20 -4.00 -3.50 -4.35 -4.01 -3.32 -2.75 -1.15 -1.65 -1.95 -0.59 -0.87 -2.31 
Nigeria      -0.78 0.09 -1.29 -1.81 -2.37 0.07 -0.59 -2.01 -1.33 -0.81 -1.24 -1.62 -1.96 -2.63 -1.31 
Norway   -2.68 -3.06 -3.35 -2.82 -2.33 -2.45 -2.64 -3.11 -3.13 -3.01 -2.73 -3.03 -3.05 -3.61 -3.11 -2.75 -3.37 -2.90 
Pakistan      -3.18 -2.42 -2.89 -3.27 -3.71 -4.44 -4.04 -4.34 -4.17 -3.62 -4.22 -4.02 -4.44 -4.31 -3.79 
Paraguay      -0.43 -2.32 -1.92 -1.58 -0.82 -0.83 0.29 -0.25 -2.10 -0.36 -1.21 -2.27 -2.38 -2.20 -1.31 
Peru      -0.43 -1.92 -1.99 -0.80 -0.25 -0.99 -0.77 -3.46 -3.37 -2.96 -2.49 -2.69 -2.77 -1.38 -1.88 
Philippines    -1.31 -0.95 -1.49 -2.03 -2.02 -2.25 -2.34 -1.97 -2.67 -3.43 -2.42 -1.32 -1.29 -0.94 -2.84 -4.07 -2.08 
Poland      -0.26 -1.64 -1.65 -1.90 -2.82 -2.76 -2.63 -3.56 -3.41 -3.17 -3.00 -3.55 -3.54 -3.63 -2.68 
Portugal  -1.44 -1.15 -1.32 -1.71 -1.75 -1.10 -1.49 -1.53 -1.87 -1.65 -1.80 -1.22 -1.92 -1.80 -1.19 -1.23 -1.18 -1.60 -1.47 
Romania           1.92 1.35 1.75 -1.25 -1.45 -2.11 -2.85 -2.46 -3.05 -0.91 
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Russia       1.63 1.23 2.84 2.55 -2.20 -4.14 -1.16 -2.35 -2.82 -3.59 -4.27 -3.05 -3.58 -1.45 
Senegal       -4.20 -4.80 -3.15 -2.72 -2.23 -1.72 -2.96 -2.25 -2.97 -2.90 -2.87 -3.69 -2.80 -3.02 
Singapore     -2.60 -3.19 -3.48 -3.16 -3.00 -2.65 -4.30 -3.84 -2.97 -2.62 -3.47 -2.46 -3.30 -1.63 -1.58 -2.95 
South Africa     -1.81 -2.18 -1.45 -1.37 -2.08 -0.91 -2.15 -2.27 -1.82 -2.36 -2.99 -1.58 -1.14 -1.91 -0.58 -1.77 
Spain  -2.42 -2.77 -2.72 -2.72 -3.25 -3.13 -3.83 -3.41 -3.76 -3.56 -3.00 -3.14 -3.70 -3.93 -3.27 -3.66 -2.40 -4.12 -3.16 
Sri Lanka      -2.63 -2.13 -2.08 -1.85 -2.09 -2.20 -2.67 -3.40 -3.26 -3.84 -4.05 -4.07 -3.26 -3.01 -2.90 
Sweden  -1.56 -1.52 -1.56 -2.44 -1.44 -1.08 -1.83 -1.68 -2.00 -1.77 -2.13 -2.11 -1.17 -1.51 -1.30 -1.22 -1.40 -1.56 -1.60 
Switzerland  -3.24 -3.20 -3.05 -3.22 -3.66 -3.42 -3.69 -3.41 -3.49 -3.28 -2.87 -2.74 -2.75 -3.11 -3.76 -3.31 -3.34 -3.24 -3.18 
Tanzania                  -2.96 -2.57 -2.77 
Thailand  -3.27 -3.61 -3.42 -3.58 -4.05 -4.04 -3.77 -4.14 -4.54 -4.43 -5.08 -5.79 -5.71 -4.03 -4.98 -4.54 -4.31 -4.83 -4.34 
Tunisia      -4.04 -3.88 -4.13 -4.10 -4.15 -4.34 -4.14 -4.10 -4.33 -4.43 -4.86 -4.81 -4.91 -5.11 -4.38 
Turkey  0.47 -2.05 -1.31 -1.11 -0.93 2.74 2.53 0.10 0.61 -0.59 -0.54 -1.95 -1.62 -0.82 -0.25 -1.45 0.14 1.08 -0.28 
Uganda       -1.41 -1.75 -1.23 -2.78 -1.68 -1.58 -1.30 0.79 1.17 -0.28 0.43 0.54 0.76 -0.64 
UK  -4.53 -4.45 -3.93 -3.91 -2.82 -3.24 -3.45 -4.00 -3.45 -3.35 -1.37 -3.93 -4.08 -4.17 -4.55 -3.77 -4.64 -4.72 -3.66 
Ukraine       0.12 10.85 9.24 5.80 2.62 2.25 -0.99 -1.74 -1.98 -2.55 -3.46 -3.14 -3.78 1.02 
Uruguay      -4.11 -1.79 -1.66 -1.86 -2.43 -3.79 -3.49 -2.97 -3.84 -3.95 -7.23 -3.08 -4.70 -3.83 -3.48 
USA  -7.03 -6.38 -6.55 -5.28 -5.09 -4.90 -4.80 -4.85 -4.74 -4.75 -4.69 -4.98 -4.94 -5.02 -4.94 -5.02 -4.80 -4.69 -5.19 
Venezuela  -1.15 -0.74 -0.67 -0.02 0.03 -1.03 -1.05 -2.09 -2.00 -1.31 -1.39 -0.73 -0.95 -0.02 -0.96 -0.85 0.19 -1.01 -0.88 
Vietnam      -2.64 -2.25 -1.58 -1.96 -2.18 -2.75 -2.86 -2.75 -3.04 -3.27 -2.92 -2.98 -3.28 -3.34 -2.70 
Zimbabwe       -3.37 -2.89 -1.59 -1.06 -1.46 0.24 2.72 4.33 4.54 2.49 1.26 1.52 1.63 0.64 
Mean  -2.79 -3.13 -2.78 -2.70 -2.87 -2.71 -2.47 -2.67 -2.64 -2.60 -2.82 -2.79 -2.94 -3.04 -2.89 -3.03 -2.96 -2.84 -2.75 -2.79 
Note: The table reports average values (by country and year) of bank-level estimates of market power, obtained using the method of Boone (2008). Initial estimates are multiplied by 10 to 
improve the expositional quality of the results. More negative values reflect higher competition.  
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Table 2 
Institutional and other determinants of bank market power 
  Panel A: Direct identification Panel B: Identification through bank characteristics 
 
(1) 
Basic 
equation 
(2) 
All 
controls 
(3) 
IV  
regression 
(4) 
Low-income 
countries 
(5) 
High-income 
countries 
(6)  
Combined 
effects 
(1) 
All countries 
(2) 
Low-income 
countries 
(3) 
High-income 
countries 
0.454*** 0.412***  0.712*** 0.293*** 0.387*** 0.380*** 0.655*** 0.309*** Market power lagged 
(16.12) (15.19)  (24.44) (13.01) (14.87) (12.50) (17.64) (9.43) 
-0.039*** -0.031*** -0.040*** 0.044*** -0.062*** -0.023** -0.027** -0.020* -0.037** Financial reform 
(-4.53) (-3.08) (-4.53) (2.84) (-3.32) (-2.36) (-2.45) (-1.90) (-2.50) 
-0.104*** -0.117*** -0.130*** -0.092*** -0.095*** -0.103*** -0.116*** -0.095*** -0.071*** 
Transparency 
(-3.12) (-3.19) (-3.48) (-2.82) (-2.83) (-2.84) (-3.01) (-3.02) (-2.70) 
-0.101*** -0.081** -0.075** -0.115*** -0.050 -0.115*** -0.101*** -0.066** -0.047 Law quality 
(-3.44) (-2.53) (-2.28) (-3.27) (-0.92) (-3.62) (-2.76) (-2.01) (-0.86) 
-0.423*** -0.391*** -0.385*** -0.294*** -0.247** -0.389*** -0.350*** -0.307*** -0.280*** Bureaucratic quality 
(-9.52) (-5.24) (-4.90) (-2.98) (-2.49) (-5.48) (-4.82) (-3.21) (-2.83) 
0.125*** 0.112*** 0.114*** 0.302*** 0.093*** 0.115*** 0.085*** 0.162*** 0.061*** 
Capitalization 
(7.14) (6.52) (6.60) (12.31) (5.02) (6.57) (4.41) (7.10) (2.75) 
0.036*** 0.038*** 0.030*** 0.061*** 0.025*** 0.040*** 0.022*** 0.030*** 0.011** 
Bank size 
(9.23) (9.50) (7.14) (16.27) (4.03) (9.63) (3.50) (5.22) (1.99) 
 0.253* 0.201 0.403*** -0.012 0.261* 0.193 0.282** 0.016 
Concentration 
 (1.71) (1.48) (3.03) (-0.09) (1.80) (1.50) (2.41) (0.05) 
 -0.579*** -0.308*** -0.547*** -0.118 -0.566*** -0.504*** -0.516*** -0.094 GDP per capita 
 (-4.35) (-2.82) (-4.25) (-1.07) (-4.29) (-4.02) (-6.20) (-0.90) 
 0.004 0.005 0.018** 0.009 0.004 0.002 0.006 0.015* GDP growth 
 (0.79) (0.92) (2.20) (0.80) (0.79) (0.26) (0.39) (1.70) 
 0.019*** 0.015*** 0.025*** 0.010** 0.019*** 0.020*** 0.023*** 0.015*** 
Inflation 
 (3.12) (2.90) (3.66) (2.37) (3.11) (2.90) (3.14) (2.77) 
     -0.011***    Financial reform * 
transparency      (-2.99)    
     -0.021***    Financial reform * 
law quality      (-2.94)    
     -0.014*    Financial reform *  
bureaucratic quality      (-1.94)    
     -0.016***    Financial reform * 
GDP per capita       (-2.90)    
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      -0.000** -0.000* -0.001*** Financial reform * 
bank size       (-2.14) (-1.70) (-3.07) 
      -0.008*** -0.007*** -0.006*** Transparency * bank 
size       (-4.05) (-5.19) (-4.76) 
      -0.007*** -0.004** -0.006*** Law quality * bank 
size       (-3.29) (-2.50) (-3.16) 
      -0.012*** -0.012*** -0.006** Bureaucratic quality 
* bank size       (-7.18) (-10.22) (-2.38) 
      -0.000** -0.000 -0.000** Financial reform * 
capitalization       (-2.40) (-0.90) (-2.55) 
      -0.002** -0.000 -0.003** Transparency * 
capitalization       (-2.21) (-0.65) (-2.30) 
      -0.000 -0.000 0.015 Law quality * 
capitalization       (-0.74) (-0.10) (0.21) 
      0.000 0.001 -0.000 Bureaucratic quality 
* capitalization       (0.18) (0.50) (-0.12) 
Bank observations 82,161 81,713 81,713 32,454 27,877 81,713 81,713 81,713 81,713 
Country observations 1,181 1,181 1,181 469 403 1,181 1,181 1,181 1,181 
Sargan (p-value) 0.307 0.382 0.295 0.141 0.250 0.300 0.407 0.282 0.166 
AR1 (p-value) 0.114 0.080 0.093 0.112 0.080 0.115 0.103 0.064 0.079 
AR2 (p-value) 0.026 0.008 0.031 0.027 0.020 0.012 0.022 0.006 0.040 
Note: The table presents coefficients and t-statistics (in parentheses) of determinants of market power, as measured by the Boone indicator. Estimation method is system 
GMM for dynamic panels, except from regression (3) of Panel A, which is carried out using an instrumental variables method for panel data. All equations include country-
specific time-effects. Sargan is the p-value of the Sargan test for overidentifying restrictions. AR1 and AR2 are the p-values of the tests for first and second order 
autocorrelation, respectively. *, ** and *** denote statistical significance at the 10, 5 and 1% level, respectively.  
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Table 3  
Sensitivity analysis using the Lerner index and the 3-bank concentration ratio as dependent 
variables 
  
(1)  
Lerner index 
equation 
(2)   
Lerner index 
equation 
(3) 
Concentration 
equation 
(4) 
Concentration 
equation 
0.406*** 0.381*** 0.911*** 0.873*** Market power lagged 
(7.12) (6.68) (99.47) (66.22) 
-0.022** -0.019* 0.003*** 0.003*** 
Financial reform 
(-2.14) (-1.83) (6.39) (5.81) 
-0.404*** -0.307*** 0.002 0.001 
Transparency 
(-5.03) (-3.41) (1.56) (0.64) 
-0.250** -0.125 -0.003* -0.003* 
Law quality 
(-1.98) (-0.90) (-1.69) (-1.72) 
-0.407*** -0.362*** -0.003 -0.003 
Bureaucratic quality 
(-3.20) (-2.99) (-1.29) (-1.22) 
0.095*** 0.081*** 0.008** 0.007** 
Capitalization 
(7.10) (5.24) (2.19) (2.03) 
0.193*** 0.176*** 0.015*** 0.017*** 
Bank size 
(3.03) (2.95) (3.15) (3.44) 
0.011 0.025   
Concentration 
(0.91) (1.32)   
-0.310** -0.317** 0.004 0.003 
GDP per capita 
(-2.35) (-2.41) (1.62) (1.05) 
0.017 0.002 -0.001*** -0.002*** 
GDP growth 
(0.62) (0.12) (-2.66) (-2.84) 
0.030*** 0.025*** 0.003*** 0.003*** 
Inflation 
(3.86) (3.44) (4.65) (4.52) 
 -0.000*  -0.001** Financial reform * 
bank size  (-1.88)  (-2.20) 
 -0.004**  -0.002 Transparency * bank 
size  (-2.17)  (-1.03) 
 -0.000  -0.000 Law quality * bank 
size  (-1.11)  (-0.02) 
 -0.008**  0.002 Bureaucratic quality * 
bank size  (-2.43)  (0.25) 
 -0.000**  -0.001** Financial reform * 
capitalization  (-2.29)  (-2.38) 
 -0.008***  -0.003 Transparency * 
capitalization  (-3.17)  (-0.72) 
 0.001  0.000 Law quality * 
capitalization  (0.28)  (0.16) 
 -0.003*  -0.001 Bureaucratic quality * 
capitalization  (-1.78)  (-0.41) 
Bank obs. 81,713 81,713 81,713 81,713 
Country obs. 1,181 1,181 1,181 1,181 
Sargan (p-value) 0.096 0.212 0.109 0.112 
AR(1) (p-value) 0.042 0.014 0.105 0.124 
AR(2) (p-value) 0.007 0.003 0.038 0.046 
Note: The table presents coefficients and t-statistics (in parentheses) of determinants of market power.
Dependent variable in columns (1)-(2) is the Lerner index, and in columns (3)-(4) the 3-bank 
concentration ratio. Columns (1)-(2) include country-specific time-effects and the rest simple time 
effects. Sargan is the p-value of the Sargan test for overidentifying restrictions. AR1 and AR2 are the p-
values of the tests for first and second order autocorrelation, respectively. *, ** and *** denote 
statistical significance at the 10, 5 and 1% level, respectively. 
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Figure 1 
Changes in competition between groups of countries 
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